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DEFLING THE RETALIATION DOCTRINE: KASTEN V SAINT-
GOBAIN AND THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION OF THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT
MADELINE ENGEL*
INTRODUCTION
Kevin Kasten was sure that the time clocks at the plant where he
worked were in the wrong place.' He thought they should be at the en-
trance, rather than the exit, of the locker room in which he "gowned" be-
fore starting work. 2 Kasten was so sure that he and his co-workers were
entitled to be paid for their time spent in the locker room that in the span of
three months, he told two supervisors and a human resources generalist on
five separate occasions that the location of the clocks was illegal.3 On De-
cember 11, 2006, roughly three months after Kasten's initial complaint, his
employer moved the time clocks to the entrance of the locker room.4 Kas-
ten was fired the same day. 5
Kasten sued, claiming that his termination violated the anti-retaliation
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 6 On appeal from an
order granting the defendant-employer's motion for summary judgment,
Kasten's claim provided the Seventh Circuit an opportunity to declare its
position on a circuit split centered around the use of the word "filed" in the
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010; B.S., Tulane University, 2005. The author would
like to thank Professor Mary Rose Strubbe and Doug Garmager for their guidance and encouragement,
as well as her family for their continued support throughout her law school education.
1. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (Mar. 22, 2010) (No. 09-834).
2. Id.
3. Id. These are the facts as pleaded by Kasten; defendant Saint-Gobain denied having received a
single complaint from Kasten regarding the location of the time clocks. Id. Defendant Saint-Gobain has
since admitted that this "gowning" time, which takes place at the beginning and end of all shifts, is in
fact compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq. (2006). Brief and Re-
quired Short Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant, Kevin Kasten at 3, Kasten, 570 F.3d 834 (No. 08-2820).
4. Brief and Required Short Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant, Kevin Kasten, supra note 3, at 6.
5. Id.
6. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837; see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (the "anti-retaliation provi-
sion" of the FLSA). This note will use "anti-retaliation provision" and "§ 215(a)(3)" interchangeably to
refer to 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
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anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA. 7 At issue was whether employees
who internally and informally complain to their employers of FLSA viola-
tions, but never reduce their complaints to writing, may properly claim to
have "filed any complaint," as that phrase is used in the anti-retaliation
provision of the FLSA.8 Although the Seventh Circuit agreed with Kasten
and the Secretary of Labor9 that a remedial statute such as the FLSA de-
mands broad interpretation, the court ultimately held that-even broadly
interpreted-the terms of the FLSA lead to the inescapable conclusion that
one simply cannot "file" a verbal complaint.10 It then affirmed the lower
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer,
Saint-Gobain.II
This note will explore the reasoning and policy concerns that are im-
plicated in determining whether an employee's verbal complaint of an
FLSA violation to an employer should qualify as a protected activity under
§ 215(a)(3) of the Act. 12 This section, also known as the anti-retaliation
provision, provides in relevant part that:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person ... to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceed-
ing under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify
in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry
committee. 13
Part I will examine the history of the Fair Labor Standards Act and its
evolution since it was enacted in 1938. Part II will present existing guid-
ance in the form of Supreme Court precedent, then move on to explore the
development of the circuit split as it stands presently. Part III will present
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain. Part IV will
7. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838-39. The court actually analyzed the claim as two issues: (1) whether
internal and informal complaints fall under the purview of the anti-retaliation provision, which the court
answered in the affirmative; and (2) whether such an internal and informal complaint must be in writing
in order to qualify as protected activity under the FLSA. Id. at 837. It is the second question that has
generated a circuit split. Id. at 838-39.
8. Id. at 837. Section 215(a)(3) provides in relevant part that "it shall be unlawful for any per-
son ... to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee
has filed any complaint . .. under or related to this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
9. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837 (noting that the U.S. Secretary of Labor, having filed a brief as amicus
curiae, supported Kasten in his argument that unwritten complaints should be deemed protected activity
under the statute).
10. Id. at 840.
11. Id.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
13. Id. The statute lists four protected activities that an employee must take as a prerequisite to
stating a claim under the anti-retaliation provision. See, e.g., Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837. This note will
refer to the "filed any complaint" language as the "complaint clause" and to the "testified or about to
testify" language as the "testimony clause."
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argue that both Supreme Court and prior Seventh Circuit precedent demand
the opposite result of the one reached in Kasten, as well as explain how
Kasten's analysis relies on inapposite case law. Part IV will conclude by
explaining why adherence to the policies embodied by the FLSA command
the opposite result from that reached by the Seventh Circuit in Kasten v.
Saint-Gobain: Specifically, that courts should read § 215(a)(3) in a manner
that protects both verbal and written internal complaints by employees.14
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE FLSA
On May 24, 1937, President Roosevelt sent the bill to Congress with a
message that America should be able to give "all our able bodied work-
ing men and women a fair day's pay for a fair day's work. . . [a] self-
supporting and self-respecting democracy can plead no justification for
the existence of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling workers'
wages or stretching workers' hours." 1 5
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 delivered on Roosevelt's 1936
election campaign promise to protect American workers from substandard
labor conditions.16 The stated policy of the FLSA is "to correct ... and
eliminate"' 7 working conditions that are "detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and gener-
al well-being of workers."' 8 The statute effectuates this policy primarily by
(1) prohibiting child labor,19 (2) instituting a federal minimum wage, 20 and
(3) requiring employers to pay employees one and one-half their regular
rate of pay for any time worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 21
While the Act's requirements may be less than revolutionary by modem
standards, the judicial context in which the Roosevelt administration pre-
sented the FLSA to Congress gave rise to considerable doubt as to whether
it would pass and, if it did, whether it would survive the challenges to its
constitutionality that were sure to follow. 22
14. See 570 F.3d at 840; 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
15. Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum
Wage, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 22, 25 (1978) (quoting FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES, VOLUME VI 209-14 (Random House 1937)).
16. Id. at 23.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b).
18. Id. § 202(a).
19. Id. §§ 203(1), 212.
20. Id. § 206.
21. Id. §207.
22. FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 248-53 (Viking Press 1946). The Supreme Court
had established a pattern of invalidating both federal and state labor laws on constitutional grounds. See,
e.g., Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 609, 618 (1936) (applying Adcins to invalidate a New York
law establishing a minimum wage for women); Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 539,
545, 561-62 (1923) (invalidating a District of Columbia law enacting a minimum wage for women and
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Now over seventy years old, the three substantive obligations of the
FLSA continue to govern the manner in which covered employers hire and
compensate employees. The Act has been amended several times; these
amendments typically serve to expand, rather than to restrict, both the
scope of the Act's coverage and the nature of remedies available in the
event of a violation. 23 The Equal Pay Act of 196324 came in the form of an
amendment to the FLSA, continuing to fulfill the Act's promise to protect
the "general well-being of workers." 25 Another example of the expansion
of the Act's protection was a 1977 amendment that allows a court to assess
previously unavailable compensatory and punitive damages against an
employer who violates the Act's anti-retaliation provision.26 In sum, histo-
ry subsequent to the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act has remained
faithful to and expanded upon Roosevelt's initial promise to protect Ameri-
can workers.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ON THE FLSA AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON
PROTECTED ACTIVITY UNDER § 215(a)(3)
The Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the question of what
constitutes a "filed" complaint in the context of § 215(a)(3).27 However,
the absence of a definitive ruling on one particular word among the thou-
sands in the statute does not leave the courts of appeals without guidance
from the Supreme Court. The lower courts can and should look not only to
Supreme Court cases parsing the language of the FLSA, but also to those
examining the language in the anti-retaliation provisions of other federal
legislation, as well as to the case law propounding certain canons of statu-
tory interpretation.
A. The Supreme Court on the FLSA and Retaliation
As discussed above, the presentation and passage of the FLSA
prompted significant concerns about and challenges to its constitutionali-
children as an unconstitutional violation of the liberty of contract); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251, 269, 277 (1918) (holding that a federal law prohibiting child labor amounted to an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress' commerce power). One such challenge to the constitutionality of the FLSA came
in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940), discussed infra Part II-A.
23. For a brief discussion of one exception to the expansive nature of FLSA amendments, see
infra note 45 on the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
25. Id. § 202(a).
26. Id. § 216(b); see also Soto v. Adams Elevator Equip. Co., 941 F.2d 543, 551 (7th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that, prior to the 1977 amendment, the only available remedies for a violation of § 215(a)(3)
were lost wages and liquidated damages).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
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ty. 28 The Supreme Court allayed those concerns in 1940, when it issued its
opinion in United States v. Darby.29 In upholding the Act against the con-
stitutional challenge of an employer indicted for having violated the sta-
tute, 30 Darby marked the first, but certainly not the last, occasion on which
the Court relied fairly heavily on the policy concerns underlying the Act to
bolster its analysis.31 To that end, the Court found that the FLSA's primary
policy goals were to eliminate both "[working] conditions detrimental to
the maintenance of the minimum standards of living necessary for health
and general well-being" and "[the] spreading and perpetuating [of] such
substandard labor conditions" across the country. 32
Underscoring the point that the best approach to interpreting the FLSA
is one that focuses on the Act's greater societal goals, the Darby Court
declared that "legislation aimed at a whole embraces all its parts." 33 To
animate this concept, the Court first declared that Congress could constitu-
tionally prohibit the interstate shipment of goods produced in violation of
the Act. 34 Then, finding that the manufacture of such goods constitutes one
part of the prohibited interstate shipment even if the manufacture does not
cross state lines, the Court held that Congress could prohibit the non-
compliant, intrastate manufacture. 35 The Court also made clear that a viola-
tion of the FLSA in the course of even small-scale production similarly
contributes to the whole "evil aimed at by the Act," and was prohibited just
as any other violation. 36 Ultimately, if an employer's practices could rea-
sonably result in the interstate shipment of goods produced in a manner that
violated the FLSA, those practices contributed to the spread of unaccepta-
ble working conditions targeted by the Act. Such practices are therefore
prohibited as well, as the FLSA "embrace[s]" them as one part of the whole
prohibition on interstate shipments. 37
Four years after Darby, the Court heard a case that presented an ideal
opportunity to reanimate the concept of "embrac[ing]" each part of legisla-
tion as sweeping as the FLSA. 38 Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Compa-
ny v. Muscoda Local No. 123 presented the question of whether miners
28. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
29. 312 U.S. 100 (1940).
30. Id. at 108, 125-26.
31. See id. at 115.
32. Id. at 109-10.
33. Id. at 123.
34. Id. at 115.
35. Id. at 123.
36. Id. at 122-23.
37. Id at 115, 122-23.
38. See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
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undertook "work" or "employment," as those terms are used in the statute,
when they traveled to and from the site at which they mined iron ore.39
Confronted with the task of interpreting the language at issue without any
applicable statutory definitions, the Court demonstrated that when defining
particular language in the Act, the interpretation must remain faithful to the
statute's purposes. 40 Before beginning its analysis, the Court made explicit
that it could properly define the terms in question "only by discarding for-
malities and adopting a realistic attitude, recognizing that we are dealing
with human beings and with a statute that is intended to secure them the
fruits of their toil and exertion." 4 1
With this principle in mind, the Court mandated that the FLSA "not be
interpreted in a narrow, grudging manner," because only a broad applica-
tion of the statute could animate the legislation's "remedial and humanita-
rian purpose."42 Having clarified the great degree of protection the FLSA
must afford to workers who fall within its ambit, the Court then gave the
terms at issue their colloquial meaning. 43 Writing for the majority, Justice
Murphy held that the travel time at issue did constitute "work," thus requir-
ing that the employers compensate employees for such time.44 In so doing,
Justice Murphy underscored that the purpose of the statute compelled this
reading because only by so broadly defining "work" would the miners re-
ceive "the just remuneration guaranteed them by the Act for contributing
their time, liberty and strength primarily for the benefit of others." 45
39. Id. at 591-92.
40. Id at 591-92, 597.
41. Id. at 592.
42. Id. at 598.
43. Id.
44. Id at 603.
45. Id The holding in Tennessee Coal that travel time from the mine entrance to the working face
constituted "work" under the Act was superseded three years later when Congress amended the FLSA
by passing the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 25-26 (2005) (citing
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (2006))). Ten-
nessee Coal was the first case in what has been called the "Supreme Court Portal-to-Portal trilogy";
both subsequent Supreme Court cases and commentators assert that the last of the cases in the trilogy
was truly the trigger for the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the
newly emerging definition of "work" had effectively voided "long-established customs, practices, and
contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unexpected liability, immense in
amount and retroactive in operation"); see also Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of
the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 53, 96 (1991) (noting that Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery, 328 U.S. 680 (1946), was unique from the first two cases in the trilogy because of the "ordina-
riness" of the factory in which the plaintiff-employees worked and the risk that the "near-universality"
of the defendant-company's practices would open the door to litigation potentially resulting in "billions
of dollars in retroactive payments and liquidated damages"). Accordingly, the passage of the Portal-to-
Portal Act does not reflect disapproval or the correction of the Tennessee Coal mandate that lower
courts interpret the FLSA broadly. It was not a misinterpretation of the term "work" that brought about
the amendment, but a desire to stem a flood of related litigation, which, at an economically sensitive
time, "threaten[ed] the very existence of thousands of business[es]." Id. at 133-34 (quoting Portal to
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The Tennessee Coal case, and its command that the Act not receive a
"narrow, grudging interpretation," 46 did not completely eliminate the diffi-
culty of interpreting what was, at that time, unfamiliarly liberal and sweep-
ing legislation. The lack of a singular, clear approach to interpreting this
New Deal legislation resulted in confusion among the courts and parties
litigating FLSA claims; such claims often presented surprisingly unfamiliar
territory, even where the issue was one of applying a term as seemingly
straightforward as "employee." 47
If the people and companies falling under the coverage of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act retained any notion following Darby and Tennessee
Coal that the statute was meant to apply in a strict, prescribed manner,
Justice Reed's 1947 opinion for the Court in Rutherford Food Corp v.
McComb dispelled any such notion.48 The issue in Rutherford Food was
distinct from that in Tennessee Coal to the extent that the FLSA does de-
fine an employee, which was the term at issue in Rutherford Food.49 The
statute's definition, however, did not shed any light on the question of who
qualifies as an employee under the Act, as the statute circularly defined an
employee as "any individual employed by an employer." 50 As a result, the
Supreme Court found itself in a situation similar to that in Tennessee Coal,
and it again called on the Act's remedial purpose as its primary source of
guidance. 51
The defendant in Rutherford Food operated a slaughterhouse in Mis-
souri and had contracted with several individuals who were to bone the
beef that came through the slaughterhouse. 52 The workers furnished their
own tools and equipment, and they were not members of the union to
which all of the other slaughterhouse employees belonged.53 The district
court held that these factors, among others, led to the conclusion that the
workers were independent contractors, rather than "employees" as defined
under the Act. 54 The district court's holding accorded with the common
Portal Wages: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 17
(1947)).
46. 321 U.S. at 597.
47. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1947).
48. See id. at 730; Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. at 597; Darby, 312 U.S. at 122-23.
49. Compare Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 728 n.6 (quoting statute's definition of "Em-
ployee" as "any individual employed by an employer"), with Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. at 597 (noting the
absence of any statutory definition of the terms at issue).
50. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 728 n.6 (reprinting the then-current definition of "em-
ployee").
51. Id. at 726-27, 730; Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. at 597.
52. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 724-25.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 726.
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law test of control, which was a popular method of determining whether a
particular class of workers qualified as employees, as opposed to indepen-
dent contractors. 55
The Supreme Court did not agree that the common law test of control
was the appropriate way to determine coverage under the FLSA. 56 The
Court did not claim that applying the right-to-control test would have de-
feated the plain meaning of the word "employee"; rather, the Court did not
assert that any plain meaning could be ascribed to the undefined-yet es-
sential-terms of the statute. 57 Presented with the opportunity to define a
term so vital to the statute's proper coverage, the unanimous Court reani-
mated its earlier pronouncement that the application of the Act, and conse-
quently the definitions therein, must be expansive. 58 The Court so broadly
interpreted the term "employee" that the FLSA came to protect "many
persons and working relationships, which prior to this Act, were not
deemed to fall within an employer-employee category." 59 In holding that
the workers in question were "employees" under the statute, the Supreme
Court adopted the lower court's conclusion that "underlying economic
realities" must dictate the interpretation of the FLSA.60 In fact, these "eco-
nomic realities" are so essential to the proper application of the FLSA that
they simply override even the longstanding, commonly used definitions of
terms as integral to the Act as "employee." 6 1
Perhaps more akin to the present issue than those before the Court in
Darby, Tennessee Coal, and Rutherford Food, the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, albeit in a context dis-
tinct from that in which the Seventh Circuit decided Kasten.62 In Mitchell
v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., the issue before the Court stemmed from
a provision found in § 217 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which at that
time prohibited the district courts from "order[ing] the payment ... of un-
paid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an additional
55. Walling v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516-17 (10th Cir. 1946).
56. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S at 726-27,730.
57. Id. at 728-30.
58. Id. at 730.
59. Id. at 729 (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947)).
60. Id. at 726-27 (quoting Walling, 156 F.2d at 516-17).
61. Id at 726-27, 731.
62. Compare Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 289 (1960) (addressing
whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under the FLSA to order an employer to reimburse
wages lost as a result of a violation of § 215(a)(3)), with Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2009) (addressing whether (1) informal, internal complaints and (2)
unwritten, verbal complaints enjoy the protection of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA).
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equal amount as liquidated damages" in an action brought under § 215.63
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit earlier found that this language
clearly denied the district court jurisdiction to order reimbursement of wag-
es lost because of an employer's § 215(a)(3) violation. 64 Three dissenting
Justices agreed with the Fifth Circuit, relying on the section's seemingly
explicit language denying the district court jurisdiction. 65
Writing for the majority, however, Justice Harlan applied a line of rea-
soning rife with the same principles expounded in Rutherford Food thirteen
years earlier. 66 The Mitchell majority refused to turn a blind eye to the
public interest inherently implicated in the FLSA in favor of a quick and
dirty plain-text assessment; instead, the Mitchell majority reaffirmed that
the only proper analysis of the Fair Labor Standards Act's language is one
that gives full effect to Congress' intent to "foster a climate in which com-
pliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced."67
Rather than consider itself bound by the text, the Mitchell majority looked
to the policies underlying the anti-retaliation provision and the FLSA gen-
erally. 68
Expanding on its finding that Congress intended that the FLSA be en-
forced through the "information and complaints" 69 of covered employees,
the Court then determined what effect, if any, the denial of district court
jurisdiction to order payment of wages might have on the undeterred func-
tioning of the Act. 70 The Mitchell Court acknowledged the reality that "fear
of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees
quietly to accept substandard conditions." 7 As such, an employee might
prefer not to complain of an FLSA violation at all if the provision at issue
permitted an employer to withhold wages and drag out litigation, leaving
the employee without pay until a final judgment is entered. 72 The Mitchell
majority refused to allow an employee's choice to exercise her rights under
the FLSA to constitute a "calculated risk."73 Because forcing an employee
to choose between reporting a perceived FLSA violation and potentially
63. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289 (quoting the then-current version of 29 U.S.C. § 217). This section
of the FLSA has since been amended and now accords with the Court's holding in Mitchell. Compare
29 U.S.C. § 217 (2006), with Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 296.
64. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 290.
65. Id. at 297 (Whittaker, Black & Clark, JJ., dissenting).
66. Id. at 289-97; see generally Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
67. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
68. Id. at 292-93.
69. Id. at 292.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 293.
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facing the indefinite withholding of her wages may lead a covered worker
to "decide that matters had best be left as they are," 74 the Court again
adopted an extremely broad reading of the statute, allowing the Act to func-
tion with optimal efficiency. 75
While the Mitchell holding itself is of little import today given the
change in the statute's language, 76 many of the courts of appeals have
gleaned significant guidance from the reasoning propounded in Mitchell in
determining where to draw the line between protected and unprotected
activity under the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA. 77 Furthermore,
Supreme Court case law interpreting the FLSA is not the only source of
guidance to which the courts of appeals can turn. Because so many federal
statutes have explicit or implied anti-retaliation provisions, 78 there are a
number of cases outside of the FLSA context that expound the principles of
properly applying anti-retaliation statutes.
An example of this came as recently as 2008, when the Court decided
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries.79 CBOCS presented the question of
whether a plaintiff could properly state a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.80 Although the statute contains no explicit anti-retaliation provi-
sion, the CBOCS Court found that the prohibitions of § 1981 itself must
extend to retaliation against individuals who seek to exercise the rights
explicitly granted by the statute. 81 The majority found that permitting reta-
liatory actions would ultimately perpetuate the very sort of discrimination
that the statute was designed to eliminate, regardless of the fact that § 1981
contains no anti-retaliation provision. 82
The manner in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the FLSA
evinces a clear pattern. Rather than applying preconceived notions of what
any single provision or term means, courts must instead seek out the inter-
pretation that best effectuates the underlying purposes of the Act. 83 It is
74. Id. at 292.
75. See id. at 296.
76. See sources cited supra note 63.
77. See, e.g., Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d 1546, 1549 (8th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. White & Son Enters.,
881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1987); Love v.
RE/MAX of America, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984).
78. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (explicit anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (explicit anti-retaliation provision of Age Discrimination
in Employment Act); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (finding implied anti-
retaliation provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
79. 553 U.S. 442.
80. Id. at 445.
81. Id at 452.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
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true that such an approach may result in a reading of the statute that does
not place great weight on a plain meaning assessment. 84 Nonetheless, this
technique has been repeated consistently in the Court's opinions on the
FLSA, and the Court has even gone so far as to find anti-retaliation provi-
sions where none exist; it follows that where lower courts refuse to broadly
interpret § 215(a)(3) of the FLSA, such courts contravene binding Supreme
Court precedent.85
B. The Circuit Split on Protected Activity Under FLSA § 215(a)(3) 86
1. Circuits Finding Oral Complaints to be Protected Under § 215(a)(3)
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain references four opinions handed down by
three courts of appeals, all of which granted the protection of the anti-
retaliation provision to employees who verbally complained of FLSA vi-
olations. 87 Three of these four cases have in common that they reference
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry;88
the fourth case cites to the reasoning utilized by the other three, specifically
pointing to the parts of those three opinions which incorporate language
from Mitchell.89 A survey of the factual situations from which these opi-
nions arose animates the broad applicability of the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Mitchell.
Before the circuit split on the issue developed, the Eighth Circuit ad-
dressed the question of whether verbal protests of FLSA violations were
protected under the anti-retaliation provision when it decided Brennan v.
Maxey 's Yamaha, Inc.90 The action, brought by the Secretary of Labor,
alleged that an investigation by the Department of Labor revealed that the
defendant-employer had violated certain provisions of the FLSA. 91 Upon
84. See, e.g., id. at 292-93.
85. See CBOCS, Inc., 553 U.S. at 452; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292, 296; Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729(1947); Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S.
590, 602-03 (1944).
86. The circuit split is presented here as the Seventh Circuit presented it in Kasten. For a general
overview of the circuit split on retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, see Jennifer Clemons,
FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum ofEmployee Protection, 53 BAYLOR L. REv. 535 (2001).
87. 570 F.3d at 839-40 (citing EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir.
1992); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Richardson, 812
F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987); Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, 513 F.2d 179, 183 (8th Cir. 1975)).
88. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d at 1011 (citing Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292); Richardson, 812
F.2d at 124 (citing Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292); Maxey's Yamaha, 513 F.2d at 181 (citing Mitchell, 361
U.S. at 293).
89. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d at 989 (citing Maxey's Yamaha, 513 F.2d at 181; White & Son
Enters., 881 F.2d at 1011; Richardson, 812 F.2d at 124-25).
90. 513 F.2d 179.
91. Id. at 180.
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learning of the violation, the defendant "promptly agreed" to pay its em-
ployees the back wages they were due under the Act. 92 However, instead of
simply delivering the checks for the wages owed, the employer not only
asked its employees to endorse the checks back to Maxey's, but also asked
that the employees sign a wage receipt form confirming that they had re-
ceived their back wages. 93 Judith Holman, an employee, refused to partici-
pate, as she correctly believed that this "scheme" violated the FLSA.94 In
response, her supervisor gave her two options: She could either endorse the
check back to the company and sign the receipt, or she could be fired. 95
Refusing to acquiesce to her supervisor's demands, Holman ultimately took
the check, refused to endorse it back or sign for its receipt, and was termi-
nated.96
The lower court entered judgment for the defendant-employer on the
FLSA retaliation claim at the close of trial. 97 The district court reached its
conclusion based on evidence that the defendant did not intend to indefi-
nitely deprive its employees of their back wages; rather, the company alle-
gedly had insufficient funds to cover the checks for the employees' back
wages and wished to treat the endorsement of the checks as a loan to the
company, which it would later repay to the employees. 98 The district court
then reasoned that since the defendant had not intended to engage in any
illegal scheme to permanently deprive the employees of their backpay,
Holman was not protesting an actual violation of the Act and, therefore,
could not claim the protection of the anti-retaliation provision. 99
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding clear er-
ror in the lower court's reasoning and holding. 00 The appellate court ac-
knowledged that the defendant did not intend to deprive the employees
indefinitely of the wages they were due and therefore had not technically
violated the FLSA, but the absence of a clear violation did not end the mat-
ter.101 The court found that above all, it was obliged to protect an em-
ployee's decision to lawfully assert her rights under the FLSA when she
reasonably believed those rights to be in jeopardy, regardless of whether
92. Id
93. Id.
94. Id. at 180-81.
95. Id. at 181-82.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 180.
98. Id. at 182-83.
99. Id
100. Id. at 183.
101. Id. at 182-83.
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the employer violated the Act.102 Such a holding was necessary to avoid
the unsavory choice, which Mitchell sought to prohibit, between asserting
one's rights and enjoying the protection of § 215(a)(3) on the one hand, or
choosing not to complain out of fear that § 215(a)(3) might not actually
serve to protect a complaining employee on the other.103 Any other result
would defeat the anti-retaliation provision's purpose "of preventing em-
ployees' attempts to secure their rights under the Act from taking on the
character of a 'calculated risk."' 104
Eight years later, the Third Circuit decided Brock v. Richardson, an
action instituted by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of George Banyas; the
facts of the case were analogous to those in Maxey 's Yamaha to the extent
that the anti-retaliation provision did not literally extend to the factual cir-
cumstances before the court. 105 In Richardson, however, the defendant-
employer mistakenly believed that Banyas had contacted the Department of
Labor to complain of overtime violations when in fact another of Richard-
son's employees had contacted the Department.106 After terminating Ba-
nyas, the defendant made several statements indicating that the reason for
the termination was its belief that Banyas had complained to the Depart-
ment of Labor.' 0 7 On appeal to the Third Circuit, the defendant argued that,
since it only believed that Banyas had engaged in protected activity, Ba-
nyas could not claim the protection of the anti-retaliation provision.10 8 This
argument seems to follow from the plain language of § 215(a)(3), since the
anti-retaliation provision affords protection based on an employee's ac-
tions, rather than on what actions an employer believes the employee has
taken.109
The Third Circuit in Richardson, much like the Eighth Circuit in Max-
ey 's Yamaha, opted to conduct its analysis by considering the potential
effects of its holding on the proper functioning of the statute as a whole,
rather than by parsing out the language of the anti-retaliation provision."10
Quoting heavily from both Tennessee Coal and Mitchell, the court con-
cluded that the reach of § 215(a)(3) must first account for "the need to pre-
102. Id. at 181.
103. See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 293 (1960).
104. Maxey's Yamaha, 513 F.2d at 181 (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 293).
105. See Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1987) (where the employer mistaken-
ly believed the employee had engaged in a protected activity and terminated him in retaliation); Max-
ey's Yamaha, 513 F.2d at 182 (where the employee mistakenly believed an FLSA violation was taking
place, protested the violation, and was terminated in retaliation for the protest).
106. Richardson, 812 F.2d at 122.
107. Id. at 122-23.
108. Id. at 123.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
110. See Richardson, 812 F.2d at 123-24; Maxey's Yamaha, 513 F.2d at 181.
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vent employees' 'fear of economic retaliation' for voicing grievances about
substandard conditions."I' Finding that Richardson's discharge of Banyas
created the same "atmosphere of intimidation" that the discharge would
have created had Banyas actually complained, the court affirmed the judg-
ment finding the defendant liable under the anti-retaliation provision.112
Unlike the factual circumstances of Maxey 's Yamaha and Richardson,
in EEOC v. White & Son Enterprises there was no misunderstanding as to
whether the employer's practices violated the FLSA, nor was there any
question as to whether the employer properly identified the employees who
wished to complain of a violation.113 In White & Son, the defendant-
employer had been warned that some of the company's female employees
had discovered they were being paid less than their male coworkers, and
that the female employees wished to discuss the pay disparity with the de-
fendant the following morning. 114 The next day, the defendant entered the
room in which the women were waiting to speak to him and told them, "I
ain't going to give you no raise.""15 He then left the room and instructed
his secretary to issue the women's final paychecks.116
On appeal, the defendant argued that the terminated female employees
had not explicitly carried out any of the actions listed in the anti-retaliation
provision and, therefore, could not properly state a claim under that sec-
tion. 117 The Eleventh Circuit, much like the Eighth Circuit in Maxey's Ya-
maha and the Third Circuit in Richardson, did not allow the statutory
language to dictate its holding.1 18 Instead, it reached its holding based upon
what would best animate the remedial purposes of the FLSA, as explained
in Tennessee Coal, and upon consideration of how essential the anti-
retaliation provision is to the proper functioning of the Act, as explained in
Mitchell. "9 Specifically, the court recognized that the purpose of
§ 215(a)(3) was to ensure that employees feel free to protest FLSA viola-
tions, since such protests are the primary reporting mechanism of FLSA
111. Richardson, 812 F.2d. at 124 (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292).
112. Id. at 125.
113. EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989).
114. Id at 1007; see also infra note 123 and accompanying text.
115. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2 at 1011.
116. Id. at 1008.
117. Id. at 1011.
118. See id.; Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123-24 (3d Cir. 1987); Brennan v. Maxey's
Yamaha, 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975).
119. See White & Sons Enters., 881 F.2d at 1011 (citing Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc.,
361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960); Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597
(1944)).
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violations, which in turn ensure compliance with the Act. 120 Guided by
these principles, the court held that "unofficial complaints . .. constitute an
assertion of rights protected under the statute."1 21
The last case to which Kasten refers is the Sixth Circuit's opinion in
EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools.l 22 In Romeo Community Schools, the
defendant-employer was paying a female custodian over one dollar less per
hour than her male counterparts.1 23 The female employee complained of
the disparity, informing the defendant that she believed the school's prac-
tice of paying her less than the male custodians was "breaking some sort of
law."' 24 Following this complaint, but before any formal proceedings had
been initiated, the defendant-employer stopped calling the female custodian
in for temporary work, and began hiring less senior custodians for perma-
nent positions. 125
The district court had granted summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant-employer on the retaliation claim, adopting the defendant's posi-
tion that the court must construe § 215(a)(3) narrowly, such that no
retaliation claim will lie unless the complaining employee has initiated
formal proceedings, either in court or with a government agency. 126 The
Sixth Circuit had little trouble in reversing the entry of summary judgment,
finding clear error in the district court's reasoning and narrow construction
of § 215(a)(3).127 Rather than requiring the filing of any formal proceed-
ings, the court stated that an employee need only assert the protection of
the Act in order to enjoy the protections of the anti-retaliation provision; a
formal filing is not determinative.128 The Sixth Circuit found support for
this proposition in Maxey's Yamaha, Richardson, and White & Son. 129
120. Id. (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292) (stating that "'[fjor... practical and other reasons,'
Congress sought to secure compliance with the substantive provisions of the labor statute by having
'employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied' lodge complaints or supply infor-
mation to officials regarding allegedly substandard employment practices and conditions").
121. Id.
122. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing
EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1992)).
123. 976 F.2d at 986. This claim arose under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), which is an
amendment to the FLSA. Due to its inclusion as part of the FLSA, retaliation claims under the Equal
Pay Act are governed by § 215(a)(3). See Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d at 986-89.
124. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d at 989.
125. Id. at 987,
126. Id. at 989.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. The court also cited Love v. RE/MAX of America,
Inc., which construed the anti-retaliation provision to apply to "the unofficial assertion [of] rights
through complaints at work." Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d at 989 (quoting Love v. RE/MAX of Ameri-
ca, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984)).
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The approaches of the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits in these
cases have the common goal of reaching a result that effectuates the pur-
poses of the FLSA and allowing the statute to function properly.130 All
three rulings send a clear message to employers that it is unlawful under the
FLSA to retaliate against an employee who asserts her rights under the Act,
and that loopholes which defeat liability under § 215(a)(3), even when
seemingly apparent in the text itself, are scarce. 131 Given the Supreme
Court case law discussed in Part II-A, demonstrating that "examination of
purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation," this common thread in the
courts of appeals' reasoning is entirely sound both in method and result. 132
2. Circuits Finding Oral Complaints Not to be Protected Under
§ 215(a)(3), According to Kasten
The first case the Seventh Circuit points to in support of its holding in
Kasten is Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q, Inc.133 In Ball, an employee intended
to file a lawsuit under the FLSA; the employee informed his manager,
plaintiff Peter Ball, of his plans to sue the employer. 134 Upon revealing this
information to the president of the company, the plaintiff-manager made
clear that if he were called to testify in any such lawsuit he would testify
truthfully, rather than recount a presumably fabricated version of events
that the president suggested. 135 Ball was terminated a few days following
the conversation in which he apparently refused to perjure himself.136 At
issue in Ball, then, was the proper application of the testimony clause of
§ 215(a)(3), which provides in relevant part that "it shall be unlawful. . . to
discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee be-
cause such employee ... has testified or is about to testify in any ... pro-
ceeding [instituted under or related to this chapter]."1 37
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit framed the issue as whether an em-
ployee can claim to be "about to testify," within the meaning of
§ 215(a)(3), when no one has initiated the proceeding at which the em-
130. See Romeo Cmty Sch., 976 F.2d at 989; EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011
(11th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1987); Brennan v. Maxey's
Yamaha, 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975).
131. See Romeo Cmty Sch., 976 F.2d at 989; White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d at 1011; Richardson,
812 F.2d at 124-25; Maxey's Yamaha, 513 F.2d at 181.
132. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005).
133. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing
Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000)).
134. Ball, 228 F.3d at 362.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006)).
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ployee would testify. 138 The court first found that, because the type of
"proceeding" the Act contemplates must be "instituted" and must provide
an opportunity to testify, the proceeding must be a formal one. 139 Taking
this reasoning one step further, the court concluded that because the pro-
ceeding must have been "instituted" in order to qualify as a proceeding
encompassed by the statute, the testimony clause only protects an employee
after an individual initiates a formal proceeding.140 The court then affirmed
the dismissal of the plaintiffs retaliation claim because an intention to
testify in a not-yet-instituted formal proceeding is not the same as an em-
ployee who actually does "testify or is about to testify" in an ongoing pro-
ceeding. 141 The Fourth Circuit arrived at this holding grudgingly, taking
the time to characterize the defendant's conduct as "morally unacceptable"
and "offensive."l 42
The second case from which the Kasten court purports to gain support
is the Second Circuit's opinion in Lambert v. Genesee Hospital.143 In Ge-
nesee Hospital, the three female plaintiffs, Eva Baker, Tami Foster and
Janine Lambert, worked in the defendant's duplicating services depart-
ment. 144 When the plaintiffs' supervisor assigned a male to a temporary
supervisor position, Baker and Lambert complained that because Baker
effectively had the same position, she should receive the same, higher rate
of pay as the newly assigned male. 145 Roughly one year later, the supervi-
sor assignment was permanently assigned to the same male; the plaintiffs
alleged that in permanently assigning the male to the supervisor position,
the employer was retaliating against Baker and Lambert for having earlier
complained of unequal pay. 146
A jury found for all three plaintiffs on their FLSA retaliation claim,
finding that the complaint regarding the difference in pay between the male
supervisor and Baker caused the defendant to permanently assign the male
to the supervisor position.147 The district court, however, granted the de-
fendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and ordered a
138. Id. at 363.
139. Id. at 364.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 362 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)).
142. Id. at 364-65.
143. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing
Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993)).
144. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 50.
145. Id. at 51.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 51-52.
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new trial on the retaliation claim.148 The plaintiffs then appealed to the
Second Circuit, with the grounds for appeal resting entirely on procedural
questions regarding the district court's grant of the defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.149
The Second Circuit quickly determined that the district court had erred
both in granting the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and in ordering a new trial on the FLSA retaliation claims.150 Ra-
ther than reinstating the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, however, the
court instead issued judgment for the defendants.' 5 The holding sprung
from a sua sponte determination that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim of retaliation under the FLSA as a matter of law, "due to the different
threshold requirements of [an FLSA] retaliation claim as compared with a
Title VII retaliation claim."' 52
The Second Circuit first pointed out that Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision is broader, protecting an employee who "has opposed any prac-
tice,"1 53 whereas the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision protects an em-
ployee only after they have either (1) "filed any complaint," (2) instituted a
proceeding, or (3) testified or intended to testify in a proceeding. 154 Leav-
ing the Title VII comparison behind, the court then simply declared that the
provision's plain language allows a cause of action for retaliation when an
employee has filed a formal complaint, "but does not encompass com-
plaints made to a supervisor."15 5
Interestingly, the court proceeded to evaluate the strength of the plain-
tiffs' retaliation claim, noting that, when plaintiffs Baker and Lambert
complained that Baker should receive wages equal to those of her male
counterpart, neither plaintiff mentioned her belief that the pay disparity was
the result of gender discrimination; the plaintiffs stated simply that it was
"not fair."' 56 Although the line of reasoning is stilted, moving from a com-
148. Id. at 52.
149. Id. at 50
150. Id. at 53-54.
151. Id. at 54.
152. Id. at 54, 56. In contrast to the language of § 215(a)(3), the anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by the
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
154. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)). The Second Circuit's characteri-
zation of § 215(a)(3) omits a fourth type of protected activity: service or an intention to serve on an
industry committee. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
155. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55.
156. Id. (characterizing the complaints at issue as "simply oral complaints to a supervisor that an
employee was being paid less than the complainant thought she should have been").
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parison of the FLSA and Title VII to a plain language assessment of
§ 215(a)(3) to an analysis of the facts, the court ultimately held that the
failure to file any formal complaint was fatal to the plaintiffs' § 215(a)(3)
claim. 157
III. KASTEN V. SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTICS CORP.
In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain, the Seventh Circuit addressed two issues:
first, whether intra-company complaints constitute protected activity under
the complaint clause of § 215(a)(3); and, second, whether unwritten, verbal
complaints constitute protected activity under the same provision. 158 The
court disposed of the first issue fairly quickly, finding that the inclusion of
the word "any" in the complaint clause clearly expands the scope of the
type of complaint so as to include complaints made to an employer; thus, it
held that intra-company, informal complaints do fall within the complaint
clause. 159 This result, the court noted, was in accordance with the "vast
majority" of circuit courts to have addressed the issue of intra-company
complaints.160 The second question regarding the propriety of verbal, un-
written complaints under the section, however, called for a more thorough
analysis. 161
The Seventh Circuit approached the second question by first isolating
the language at issue in order to determine its plain meaning.162 Purporting
to look "only at the language of the statute," the court summarily stated that
the word "file," in its verb form, "connotes a writing." 63 Immediately
following this conclusion, the opinion goes on to quote a dictionary defini-
tion which "accord[s] with what [the court] believe[s] to be the common
understanding" of the verb "to file."' 64 The lower court had also referred to
a dictionary in order to support its belief that it is impossible to "file" a
verbal complaint; the appellate court approvingly recounted that portion of
the lower court's opinion.165
After determining that a verbal complaint does not constitute protected
activity under the complaint clause, the Kasten opinion addresses the cir-
157. Id. at 54-56, 58.
158. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2009).
159. Id. at 838.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 838-40.
162. Id. at 839.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 838 (quoting Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608,
612 (W.D. Wis. 2008)).
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cuit split on the issue. 166 The Seventh Circuit quoted heavily from the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Ball in support of its own holding; the court
included the holding from Genesee Hospital to support its own holding as
well.167 The court then acknowledged some of the cases that reached the
opposite result of that reached in Kasten, but found that they do not offer
any guidance, as none of those cases addressed the specific question of
whether one can "file" a verbal complaint.1 68
Kasten responded to the circuits which protect verbal complaints by
pointing to the anti-retaliation provisions of other employment statutes,
noting that the range of protected activity is broader in both Title VII and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, both of which protect an em-
ployee who has "opposed any practice" made illegal by the other provi-
sions of those laws.169 The Seventh Circuit used the broader language of
these other employment statutes to dictate the breadth of the coverage of
the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision. 170 The court did acknowledge that
the language of the FLSA demands "expansive interpretation"; ultimately,
though, because the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA uses narrower
language than other anti-retaliation provisions, and because the plain mean-
ing of the word "file" connotes a writing, the court found that to include
verbal complaints as protected activity would be to "read[] words out of the
statute," an act it refused to carry out. 171
IV. KASTEN v. SAINT-GOBAIN DEFEATED THE PURPOSE OF THE ANTI-
RETALIATION PROVISION OF THE FLSA
A. Kasten Reaches its Result by Departing from its Own Precedent and
by Disregarding Supreme Court Precedent
Before it issued its opinion in Kasten, the Seventh Circuit's FLSA ju-
risprudence evinced a pattern of broadly interpreting the Act. 172 These
166. Id. at 839-40.
167. Id. at 840.
168. Id. at 839-40.
169. Id. at 840 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006)).
170. Id
171. Id.
172. See Scott v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 195 F.3d 938, 940 (7th Cir. 1999) (characterizing
§ 215(a)(3) as prohibiting retaliation for "asserting" a claim under the FLSA); Sapperstein v. Hager,
188 F.3d 852, 856-57 (7th Cir. 1999) (characterizing the language of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provi-
sion as "very broad[,] ... warrant(ing] an expansive interpretation" and stemming from an "[evident]
policy rationale"); Shea v. Galaxie Lumber & Constr. Co., Ltd., 152 F.3d 729, 734-36 (7th Cir. 1998)
(reinstating a jury verdict of $9,100 in punitive damages against an employer found to have violated
§ 215(a)(3) where the jury had awarded no compensatory damages on the same claim); Crowley v. Pace
Suburban Bus Div. of the Reg'1 Transp. Auth., 938 F.2d 797, 799-800 (7th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that
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broad interpretations indicated a desire to proceed with an eye toward ani-
mating the statute's "humanitarian purpose," true to the principles first
announced by the Supreme Court in Tennessee Coal.173 The earlier opi-
nions also demonstrated great fidelity to some of the more basic canons of
statutory interpretation, particularly where discrete statutory language of
the FLSA was at issue. 174 Against the backdrop of its prior FLSA deci-
sions, Kasten demonstrated a significant departure from the Seventh Cir-
cuit's methods of interpreting the Act in a manner that accorded with the
Supreme Court's interpretive approach.17 5
It is only by ignoring one of the simplest methods of statutory inter-
pretation that the Kasten court arrived at its decision refusing to protect
verbal complaints under the FLSA. Supreme Court case law on statutory
interpretation requires that an inquiry into the true meaning of statutory
language begin with an examination of (1) the language itself and (2) "the
language and design of the statute as a whole."176 Yet, in addressing the
issue of whether verbal complaints constitute protected activity, the Se-
venth Circuit looked no further than the plain language of one portion of
one subsection of the Act before rejecting the plaintiffs argument that "to
file" a complaint, when defined broadly, means "to submit" a complaint. 177
Instead, the court summarily determined that the plain meaning of "to file"
so clearly demands a writing that any further analysis was unnecessary. 178
This approach by the court is puzzling. In fact, the Seventh Circuit it-
self quoted and applied the two-step method of statutory interpretation in
an earlier case requiring it to determine what statute of limitations applied
to a § 215(a)(3) action, where the statute itself was completely silent on the
issue. 179 Without explanation, however, the Kasten court excused itself
from following this previously acknowledged Supreme Court precedent
when it failed to carry out the second of these most basic steps of statutory
the language of the FLSA must receive "an expansive interpretation" and declining to find the statute's
plain language as persuasive).
173. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944); see also
sources cited supra note 172.
174. See, e.g., Crowley, 938 F.2d at 798 (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-92
(1988)) (noting that determining the meaning of a statute's plain language requires reference to "the
language and design of the statute as a whole").
175. See generally Kasten, 570 F.3d 834; see also sources cited supra note 172.
176. K Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 291 (citing Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 486 U.S. 399, 403-05
(1988); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221-22 (1986)).
177. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838-39.
178. Id.
179. Crowley, 938 F.2d at 798 (citing K Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 291).
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interpretation by ignoring the "language and design" of the entire Fair La-
bor Standards Act. 80
A survey of the entire FLSA demonstrates exactly why the compre-
hensive, two-pronged technique of statutory interpretation urged by the
Supreme Court in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 181 is so valuable. The
thrust of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Kasten is that Congress in-
tended to require employees to submit a written instrument when it chose
the word "file" in § 215(a)(3).1 82 As an initial matter, this argument loses
much of its force in light of the three separate provisions of the FLSA, one
of which appears in § 215 itself, that explicitly require a writing.183 Two
provisions demand that "consent [be] in writing,"' 84 while a third allows an
exemption for a purchaser who acquired goods manufactured in violation
of the Act, as long as the purchaser received "written assurance" from the
producer that the goods in question were manufactured in compliance with
the Act. 185 Clearly, then, when the drafters of the FLSA wished to require a
writing to satisfy the Act's requirements, they said so explicitly.
Taking the inverse of the rule declared in Kasten, the holding would
imply that, where the FLSA requires a person to submit a writing of any
sort, the act of submitting such a writing would be referred to as "filing." 86
This interpretation, however, is far more formalistic than the FLSA itself.
The Act requires that certain reports be submitted or transmitted, but not
filed, 187 and that an action for a violation of the Act may be brought,
commenced, or maintained, but not filed.' 88 And of the provisions that do
refer to a filing, two specify that the document to be filed must be in writ-
ing.1 89 That Congress was less than deliberate in the verbs it chose to de-
note the act of submitting a document is clear in § 215 itself, which
prohibits employers from falsifying "any statement, report, or record filed
or kept" pursuant to the Act's extensive recordkeeping requirements.190 If
180. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839. The court states that it is looking "only at the language of the sta-
tute," but its analysis does not look beyond the word "filed," except to include an excerpt from a dictio-
nary which supports its position. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed.
1983)).
181. K Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 291.
182. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839.
183. 29 U.S.C. §§ 214(c)(5)(A), 215(a)(1), 216(b) (2006).
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id. § 215(a)(1) (emphasis added).
186. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839 (stating that "the natural understanding of the phrase 'file any com-
plaint' requires the submission of some writing to an employer, court, or administrative body").
187. 29 U.S.C. §§ 204(d), 213(c)(5)(C)(i).
188. Id. §§ 214(c)(5)(G), 216(b), 216(c), 216(d)(3)(B), 216(d)(3)(C).
189. Id. §§ 214(c)(5)(A), 216(b).
190. Id. § 215(a)(5).
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the FLSA truly intended to mean that only written instruments can be filed,
the inclusion of "statements" in this provision is difficult to explain.19
Ultimately, such a detailed survey of the entire statute is only one me-
thod of analyzing the proper application of the "filed any complaint" provi-
sion. Although that technique arguably sheds the most light on the
intentions of the statute's drafters, an equally helpful, yet more efficient,
approach would have been to expand the scope of the analysis at least to
the entire text of § 215(a)(3). Ultimately, the Kasten court's failure to place
the language at issue in its true context relieved the court of having to justi-
fy a truly puzzling result.
In addition to refusing to comprehensively analyze the Act's language,
the Seventh Circuit fails to rationalize its sudden departure from its pre-
vious opinions applying § 215(a)(3). The Kasten opinion itself noted earlier
Seventh Circuit cases that not only upheld compensatory and punitive
damages awards, but also affirmed findings of employer liability under
§ 215(a)(3) where retaliatory acts followed an employee's internal, verbal
complaint.192 The court explained its departure from these older cases by
pointing out that, in the earlier cases, the issue of whether verbal com-
plaints are protected under § 215(a)(3) had never been argued by the par-
ties. 193 While it naturally would be less inclined to rule on the issue without
the parties having presented it, the Seventh Circuit did have at its disposal
in all of those cases the same tool utilized by the Second Circuit in Genesee
Hospital; namely, it could have dismissed some or all of those suits sua
sponte for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 194 For if submitting a verbal
complaint does not constitute "filing a complaint" under the FLSA, then an
employee who complains verbally has not engaged in protected activity,
and may not state a retaliation claim.195 While the failure to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the earlier cases is not noteworthy in
and of itself, the assuredness with which the Seventh Circuit arrived at its
holding in Kasten runs contrary to any concept of stare decisis.196
191. This gives rise to the question of whether, under the FLSA's reporting requirements, the
employer should be obligated to document statements regarding the Act's potential violation, such as
the statements Kasten made regarding the location of the time clocks. No such obligation currently
exists. See 29 C.F.R. § 516.2 (2009).
192. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837-38 (citing Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1999);
Scott v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 195 F.3d 938, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1999); Shea v. Galaxie Lumber
Constr. Co., 152 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998)).
193. Id.at837n.1.
194. See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1993).
195. See id.
196. See source cited supra note 172; see also Reich v. Davis, 50 F.3d 962, 965-56 (11th Cir.
1995) (stating that part of the basis for its holding was its previous interpretations of § 215(a)(3)).
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One noteworthy example of the previously broad interpretation the
Seventh Circuit awarded the anti-retaliation provision came in Crowley v.
Pace Suburban Bus. 197 In Crowley, the defendant-employer terminated the
plaintiff after the latter refused to attend a meeting upon being told that he
would not be compensated for his attendance.1 98 The issue on appeal was
whether the plaintiffs retaliation claim was barred by the statute of limita-
tions; if the statute of limitations under the FLSA applied, the claim would
be barred, but if the analogous state law statute of limitations applied, the
claim would be timely.199 The Act's statute of limitations provision lists
the sections to which it applies, but it does not name § 215(a)(3) among
those sections. 200
The court declared at the outset that the task before it was not "simply
to read [the FLSA's statute of limitations provision] in isolation from the
rest of the statute, [which] would be simple." 201 Underscoring that point,
the Crowley court dismissed as "unpersuasive" the holding of another court
on the same issue, where that court used just such an isolated reading. 202
Instead, the court went beyond the language in the statute of limitations
provision, and examined closely the "structure and wording of the entire
statute." 203 The Crowley court concluded that, while the statute of limita-
tions provision made no reference whatever to the anti-retaliation provi-
sion, the former provision was clearly intended to encompass claims arising
out of the latter.204 The holding stemmed in part from the court's finding
that many of the words in the FLSA "had not been given their ordinary
meaning by Congress," a fact that led the court to broadly interpret the
Act.205
The Kasten opinion did more than sharply depart from previous Se-
venth Circuit jurisprudence on the FLSA, and on § 215(a)(3) in particular;
the holding completely ignored the Supreme Court's repeated pronounce-
197. 938 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1991).
198. Id at 798. Interestingly, this type of employee protest is precisely the sort to which the Kasten
decision denies protection, given the verbal nature of the complaint. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840; Crowley,
938 F.2d at 798. In Crowley itself, though, the court acknowledged in a footnote the uncertainty as to
whether the anti-retaliation provision would apply to Crowley's verbal refusal to perform work without
receiving pay; the court quickly dismissed the question, however, stating that "§ 215(a)(3) has been
construed broadly to include retaliation by the employer for an employee's assertion of rights protected
under the FLSA." Crowley, 938 F.2d at 798 n.3 (emphasis added).
199. Crowley, 938 F.2d at 798.
200. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 255).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 801.
203. Id. at 799.
204. Id. at 801.
205. Id. at 799.
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ments that considerations of stare decisis must be especially forceful in
matters of statutory interpretation. 206 In fact, the Second Circuit's opinion
in Genesee Hospital included the Seventh Circuit's Crowley opinion in its
references to other courts of appeals which did protect employee's purely
verbal complaints to supervisors under § 215(a)(3). 207 The great impor-
tance of allowing individuals to rely on a court's prior precedent is unders-
cored by the facts of Kasten itself, where the plaintiffs knowledge of the
applicable law was sophisticated enough such that his complaint arose out
of a lesser-known provision of the FLSA, rather than the more commonly
known minimum-wage and maximum hours requirements.208
B. Kasten Reaches its Result by Relying on Inapposite Case Law and by
Mischaracterizing the Circuit Split
The Seventh Circuit asserts in Kasten that in refusing to give full ef-
fect to the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, it merely joined two of its
sister circuits on the more restrictive side of the split.209 In fact, the result
reached in Kasten is not consistent with the reasoning used by either the
Fourth Circuit or the Second Circuit in the decisions on which it claims to
rely.210 While courts often support their reasoning by citing analogous
cases of the circuits on one side of a split when joining that constituency, 211
the Kasten court uses this technique to excuse itself from justifying the
consequences of its holding. Once stripped of the improper reliance it plac-
es on clearly distinguishable reasoning, Kasten ultimately rests solely on
the fact that, in all other employment-related legislation, there exists a more
expansive retaliation provision.
While the Seventh Circuit relied on both Ball and Genesee Hospital,
the greater focus is on the former case, which Kasten quotes heavily.212
While the portions of the Ball opinion that the Kasten court selectively
recounts seem to lend significant support to Kasten's reasoning, placing the
Ball passages in the proper context reveals that any reliance on the Ball
206. See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
207. Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Crowley, 938 F.2d at 798
n.3).
208. See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836.
209. Id. at 839-40 (summarizing the reasoning used by the Fourth Circuit in Ball v. Memphis Bar-
B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000), and that used by the Second Circuit in Genesee Hospital,
10 F.3d at 55, and going on to find the reasoning on the other side of the circuit split "difficult to draw
guidance from").
210. See generally Kasten, 570 F.3d 834.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998).
212. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839 (quoting Ball, 228 F.3d at 364).
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opinion is both misplaced and misleading. 213 The analysis that the Fourth
Circuit undertook in Ball was not of a claim under the "filed any com-
plaint" provision of § 215(a)(3); rather, the issue centered around when a
plaintiff could properly claim to be "about to testify" in an FLSA proceed-
ing. 214
Thus, while the Seventh Circuit does, in passing, acknowledge that the
issue in Ball arose in the context of the testimony clause, it brushes with
deceptively broad strokes in stating that Ball held that "a faithful interpreta-
tion of the statute did not recognize mere statements to a supervisor as pro-
tected activity." 215 The effect of this statement in its proper context,
however, is that a "mere statement" about an intention to testify in a poten-
tial FLSA proceeding is not the same as actually testifying or preparing to
testify in an already-initiated proceeding. 216 In fact, the Fourth Circuit
pointed out in a footnote that Ball never invoked the protection of the com-
plaint clause of § 215(a)(3) because he never actually complained but re-
counted to a supervisor the complaint of another employee; Ball merely
refused to testify to a presumably false account of events. 217 The classifica-
tion of Ball as part of the circuit split as to the proper interpretation of the
"filed any complaint" language is misleading at best; the manner in which
the Seventh Circuit referenced it in Kasten makes this abundantly clear.218
The other case on which Kasten relied was Genesee Hospital.219 In
placing reliance on that case, however, the Seventh Circuit overlooked two
significant factors that make Genesee Hospital easily distinguishable from
Kasten. In holding that only formal complaints filed outside the company
are protected under § 215(a)(3), the Second Circuit rendered as surplusage
the "instituted any proceeding" provision of § 215(a)(3); when one files a
formal complaint with an agency or court, she has clearly instituted a pro-
ceeding. 220 This interpretation runs directly contrary to the Supreme
213. Compare id at 837 (analyzing proper scope of the complaint clause of § 215(a)(3)), with Ball,
228 F.3d at 364 (analyzing proper scope of the testimony clause of § 215(a)(3)).
214. Ball, 228 F.3d at 364 ("[W]e would not be faithful to the language of the testimony clause ...
if we were to expand its applicability to intra-company complaints or to potential testimony in a future-
but-not-yet-filed court proceeding") (emphasis added).
215. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839 (citing Ball, 228 F.3d at 364) (emphasis added).
216. See Ball, 228 F.3d at 364.
217. Id. at 363 n.* (citing Rayner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989)). In fact, the Ball court cited
to another of its cases, which held that, under a statute with an anti-retaliation provision analogous to
the FLSA, "filed any complaint" does include intra-company complaints. Id.
218. See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839 (citing Ball, 228 F.3d at 364).
219. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839 (citing Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993)).
220. See Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d at 55.
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Court's repeated warnings against reading statutory text in a way that
creates redundancy among two or more separate provisions.221
The other puzzling aspect of Kasten's reference to Genesee Hospital
is that the latter's holding is directly contrary to the first part of the Kasten
decision. While Genesee Hospital denies protection to internal complaints,
Kasten wasted no time in determining that the word "any" in "filed any
complaint" encompasses both informal and formal employee com-
plaints. 222 The Seventh Circuit's willingness to rely on the Second Circuit
for a proposition that the Seventh Circuit expressly disapproves earlier in
the Kasten opinion makes the reference to Genesee Hospital both unpersu-
asive and deceptive. 223
Stripped of the guise that its decision in Kasten is merely the result of
the Seventh Circuit's decision to adopt its sister circuits' well-reasoned and
applicable interpretations of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, the
remaining reasoning runs directly contrary to the binding Supreme Court
precedent established in Darby, Tennessee Coal, Mitchell, and Rutherford
Food Corp.224 In fact, the language at issue in Kasten is much more sus-
ceptible to varying interpretations than the clear denial of jurisdiction in
Mitchell and the terms at issue in Tennessee Coal and Rutherford Food
Corp.225 What the denial of this protection amounts to, then, is the court's
decision to "make a fortress out of the dictionary," 226 rather than grapple
with the previously acknowledged reality that the language of the FLSA
often requires the court to overlook an apparently plain meaning. 227
221. See, e.g., Nat'l Assn. of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 669 (2007)
(citing TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
222. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838; Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d at 55, 58.
223. See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838; Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d at 55, 58; see also Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 585 F.3d 310, 311-12 (7th Cir. 2009) (Rovner, J., dissenting from
denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
224. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947); Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590
(1944); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
225. See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289; Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 727-28; Tenn. Coal, 321
U.S. at 592.
226. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d. Cir. 1945).
227. Crowley v. Pace Suburban Bus Div. of the Reg'l Transp. Auth., 938 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir.
1991); see also Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARv. L. REV.
1437, 1451, 1453 (suggesting that reliance on dictionaries in statutory interpretation may lead to strange
results and that to remedy this, courts should consider the entire statutory context, "whether the contex-
tual investigation involves only the structure and content of the statute itself or a broader inquiry into
history and intent," prior to turning to dictionaries as interpretive aids).
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C. Refusing to Recognize Verbal Complaints as Protected Activity Un-
dermines the Precise Policy Concerns that the FLSA Attempts to Correct
More than a century ago, Justice Holmes explained that "[o]ne of the
eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the effort of
every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society, dis-
guised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible
return." 228 The Tennesee Coal Court referenced this conflict in the course
of its decision, making clear that a primary purpose of the FLSA is to alle-
viate the burden placed on employees by virtue of an unavoidable and inhe-
rently lopsided power struggle between them and their employers. 229 Given
this background, the importance of ensuring that employers do not exercise
their superiority through retaliation is clear. Any removal of the protection
against retaliation makes room for the re-emergence of the conflict ex-
plained by Justice Holmes, which the entire Act is intended to eliminate.
The holding in Kasten, then, could easily serve to encourage employ-
ers to exploit the loophole that previously existed only in the Second Cir-
cuit. 230 In the wake of this case, there is nothing to keep employers from
promulgating internal policies that require employees to first report any
suspected FLSA violations verbally and internally. Under Kasten, these
employees could then be fired immediately, leaving them with no cause of
action under § 215(a)(3). The need for employers to comply with FLSA
regulations has decreased significantly; employers in the Seventh Circuit
could nearly eliminate the possibility of having any FLSA violations dis-
covered, since compliance with the statute is achieved primarily through
employee reports. 231 The factual circumstances in which claims arise under
§ 215(a)(3) make it all too clear that many employers are totally undeterred
from retaliating against employees who complain of FLSA violations.232
While it is one matter for employers to engage in retaliation even when
such action is clearly prohibited by the plain text of § 215(a)(3), it is anoth-
er matter for the Seventh Circuit in Kasten to implicitly allow retaliation as
long as employers time their retaliatory action properly. This result is made
more unsavory upon consideration of the fact that many employees may
seek to broach the subject of an FLSA violation in a minimally confronta-
tional manner in order to avoid the appearance of disloyalty and, conse-
228. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 97, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
229. 312 U.S. at 592, 597.
230. See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993).
231. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292; Richardson, 812 F.2d at 123.
232. See, e.g., Love, 738 F.2d at 384 (recounting that two hours after a female employee left a
memo complaining of a pay disparity attached to a copy of the Equal Pay Act on her supervisor's desk,
the supervisor entered the female employee's office with the memo in his hand and terminated her).
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quently, the likelihood that they are exposing themselves to retaliation.
Following Kasten, however, such an employee will be forced to imme-
diately resort to more formal, time-consuming, and costly measures; this
itself may serve as a deterrent to employee reports, and, consequently, de-
creased FLSA compliance.
CONCLUSION
The holding that the Seventh Circuit reached in Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain results from the court's choice to ignore binding precedent on both
the FLSA and the rules of statutory interpretation, the court's misapplica-
tion of existing courts of appeals opinions, and the court's heavy reliance
on the plain meaning of a single word in a statute that is not to be inter-
preted by reference to a dictionary, but by reference to the actual conse-
quences the interpretation will have on the statute's underlying policies.
The combination of these factors, and the unjustifiably narrow holding to
which they lead, has created a circumstance in which an employee's deci-
sion to report an FLSA violation-and the manner in which she makes
such a report-amounts to precisely the sort of "calculated risk" 233 clearly
prohibited by the Supreme Court. The anti-retaliation provision of the
FLSA, as well as the FLSA itself, will only regain its proper, protective
function within the Seventh Circuit if and when Kasten is overruled.
233. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 293.
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